June 11, 2002

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Clerk

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Thomas P. Engleton Court House
Room 24.329
111 South 10th Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63102
U.S. GERTIFIED MAIL NO. 7001-0320-0005-1583-3086

RE: 02-2026, LAMBROS vs. U.S.A.

District of Minnesote Court/Agency Numbers: Civil No. 99-28 (DSD)

Criminal No. 4-89-82(5)(DSD)

Dear Clerk:

Sinc<u>erel</u>y,

Attached for filing in the above-entitled action is the following document:

a. MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY BY THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS. Dated: June 10, 2002.

Please find one original and three copies.

Thanking you in advance for your continued assistance in this matter.

John Cregory Lambros, Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I declare under the penalty of perjury that a true and correct copy of the above listed document/motion was mailed within a stamped addressed envelope from the USP Leavenworth Mailroom on this <u>lith</u> day of June, 2002, to:

Q.S. ATTORNEYS OFFICE, District of Minnesota, U.S. Federal Court House,
 Suite 600, 300 South 4th Street, Minnespolis, Minnesota 55415.

Ժნⴌი Gregory Lambros

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

JOHN GRECORY LAMBROS.

* APPEAL NO. 02-2025

Petitioner - Appellant.

District of Minnesota Court/Agency Numbers: Civil No. 99-28 (DSD)

vs.

Criminal No. 4-89-82(5)(DSD)

UNITED STATES OF AMERCIA.

* AFFIDAVIT FORM

Respondent - Appellee

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MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY BY THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

NOW COMES the Petitioner - Appellant, John Gregory Lambros, Pro-Se, (hereinafter Movant) and requests this Honorable Court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253, for the issuance of a Certificate of Appealability (hereinafter COA), as the District of Minnesota Court ruled, pro forms on May 29, 2002, that the court would not grant such a COA when the court DENIED Movant's "MOTION TO VACATE ALL JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS BY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ROBERT G. RENNER PURSUANT TO RULE 60(6)(6) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR VIOLATIONS OF TITLE 28 U.S.C.A. § 455." Judge Renner was the U.S. Accorney who indicted Movant.

The District Court erred in holding, in <u>square conflict</u> with the U.S. Supreme Court decision <u>LILJEBERG vs. HKALTH SERVICES CORP.</u>, 486 US 847, 100 L.Ed2d 855, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) and other efrents, that every Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion constitutes prohibited "second or successive" habeas petition as matter of law. The District Court stated, "Although petitioner purports to bring this motion under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court concludes that it must be treated as a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 since Lambros is attempting to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence."

See, March 08, 2002, <u>ORDER</u> by Judge Duty, Page 3.

APPELLANT HAS MADE A SUBSTANTIAL SHOWING OF A DENIAL OF A CONSTITIONAL RIGHT:

The Supreme Court in CHAPMAN vs. CALLFORNIA, 17 1.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967) stated that an impartial judge is a constitutional right so basic to a fair trial that its infraction can never be treated as harmless error. Quoting, TONEY vs. ONIO, 273 US 510, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927). See. CHAPMAN, 17 L.Ed.2d at 710 n.8.

ON APRIL 22, 2002, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT GRANTED CERTIORARI ON THE VERY SAME QUESTION:

- CERTIORARI on the very same question that the District Court DENIED Movant's 'MOTION TO VACATE ALL JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS BY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ROBERT C. RENNER PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b)(6) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE POR VIOLATIONS OF TITLE 28 U.S.C.A. § 455." in ABDUR'RAHMAN vs. Bell, 601-9094, questions presented:
 - (1) Pld Sixth Circuit err in holding, in square conflict with decisions of this court and other circuits, that every Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion constitutes prohibited "second or successive" habeas petition as matter of law? (emphasis added)
 - (2) Does court of appeals abuse its discretion in refusing to permit consideration of vital intervening legal development when failure to do so precludes habeas pasitioner from ever receiving any adjudication of his claims on merits?
- See, KIHIBIT A (CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER, April 24, 2002, Volume 7t, No. 4, Pages 2026 and 2028)

STATIMENT OF THE CASE

3. Movant incorporates and restates his attached April 10, 2002, MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, that was filed with the Coited States District Court for the District of Minnesota. See, EXHIBIT B. Movaust also requests this court to hear, review, and incorporate the <u>full record</u> that was developed within the District Court. Movant requested the Clerk of the District Court to certify and transmit the full record to this court on June 5, 2002.

ISSUES MOVANT SEEKS TO PRESENT ON APPEAL

- 4. Again, Movant incorporates the restates the following three (3) issues within his April 10, 2002, MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, that was filed with the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, EXHIBIT B, and incorporates the full record that was developed within the District Court:
 - a. ISSUE ONE (1): WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT ALLOWING REVIEW UNDER THE CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF RULE 60(b)(6) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES FOR VIOLATIONS OF TITLE 28 USCA \$ 455(a) AND 455(b)(3), UNDER THE STANDARD ESTABLISHED IN LILJEBERG VB. HEALTH SERVICES CORP., 486 US 847 (1988)?
 - b. ISSUE TWO (2): WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY REVIEW THE QUESTION OF RECUSAL DE NOVO ON REVIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS?
 - E. ISSUE THREE (3): WHETHER JUDGE RENNER AND NOEL ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION BY THEIR FAILURE TO DISQUALIFY THEMSELVES FOR VIOLATIONS OF \$ 455(a) AND \$ 455(b)(3) AT THE TIME THEY REARD MOVANT LAMBROS' CASE AND ENTERED JUDGMENT, AS BOTH JUDGE RENNER AND NOEL HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS AND LAW?

CONCLUSION

5. Movant Lambros requests this Court to issue a COA, as Movant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. To meet what the Ninth Circuit has referred to as this "modest standard," see CHARLES vs. HICKMAN, 278 F.3d 981, 982 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000), this Movant "must demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the

issues [in a different number]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." <u>BAREFOOT vs. ESTELLE</u>, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.l., 103 S.Ct. 3383, /7 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983). Quoting, <u>RANIXOLPH vs. KEMNA</u>, 276 F.3d 401, 403 u.l (8th Cir. 2002).

- debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner and that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further, when it <u>CRANTED CERTIORARI</u> in <u>ABDUR RAHMAN vs. BELL.</u>, #01-9094, no April 22, 2002, on the <u>very same question</u> Movant has presented within this COA. See, Paragraph Two (2) within this motion.
- 7. I JOHN GRECORY LAMBROS, declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Title 28 U.S.C.A. \$ 1746.

EXECUTED ON: June 10, 2002

John Gregory Lambros, Pro Se

Reg. No. 00436-124

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Injunctive collect is available in private plaintiffs under civil remedy provision of Racketeer influenced and Cornupt Organizations Act, 18 USC 1964; allegation that antishortion protesters took clinic patients; right to seek medical services, clinic decrors; right to perform their jubs, and climes; right to provide medical services and otherwise conduct their businesses, although involving loss of intangible property in form of rights, stated main for "obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, of fear," within meaning of definition of extortion in Busines Act, 18 USC 1961.

Questions presented: (1) Did Seventh Circuit correctly hold, in acknowledged conflict with Ninth Circuit, that injunctive relief is available in private civil action for troble damages brought under RICO statute? (2) Does Hobbs Act which toakes it crime to obstruct, delay, or affect interstate commerce "by rubbery or extortion," and which defines "extortion" as "the obtaining of property from another, with (the owner's) consent," when such consent is "induced by the wrungful use of actual or threatened force, viulence, or fear 18 USC 1951 (b) (2), criminalize activities of political protesters who engage in sit-ins and demonstrations that ubstruct public's access to business's premises and interfere with freedom of putative customers to obtain services offered there?

01-1119 Operation Rescop v. National Organization for Women Inc.

Racketeering—Private civil actions—Injunctive relief— Hobbs Act,

Reling below (National Organization for Women Inf. v. Scheidler, 7th Cic., 267 F 1d 687, 70 LW 1218 (2001));

Injunctive relief is available to private plaintiffs under civil remody provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 1d USC 1964; allegation that intiabortion protesters took clinic patients' right to seek medical services, clinic doctors' right to perform their jobs, and clinics' right to provide medical services and otherwise conduct their businesses, although involving loss of intangible property in form of rights, stated claim for "obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear" within meaning of definition of extension in Hobbs Act, 18 USC 1951.

Questions presented (1) Did Seventh Circuit correctly hold, in acknowledged conflict with Ninth Circuit, that injunctive relief is available in private civil action for treble damages brought under RICO statute? (2) Does Hobbs Act, which makes it crime to obstruct, delay, or affect interstate commerce "by robbery or extortion," and which defines "extortion" as "the obtaining of property from another, with [the owner's] consent," when such consent is "induced by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear," 18 USU 1951(b)(2), criminalize activities of political protestors who engage in sit-ins and demonstrations that obstruct public's access to business's premises and interfere with freedom of putative customers to obtain services offered there?

61-9094 Abdur Rahman v. Bell

Habrus corpus—Second or successive petitions— Intervening legal development.

Ruling below (6th Cir., 1/18/02, unpublished, and 2/11/03, unpublished):

Motion under Fod.R.Civ.P 60(b) for relief from judgment holding that claims asserted in habeas corpus action were procedurally defaulted, which motion was based upon intervening adoption of state supreme court rule relating to exhaustion of state remedies respecting claims of error, was properly construct by district court as equiva-

lent of successive habeas corpus perition and, as such, is denied for movant's failure to satisfy criteria of 28 USC 2244(b)(2).

Questions presented: (i) Did Sixth Circuit err in holding, in square cunflict with decisions of this court and other circuits, that every Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion constitutes prohibited "school or successive" habeas petition as matter of law? (2) Does court of appeals abuse its discretion in refusing to permit consideration of vital intervening legal development when failure to do so precluded habeas petitioner from ever receiving any adjudication of his claims on merits?

Petition for certiorari filed 3/19/92, by Thomas C. Goldstein, Amy Howe, and Goldstein & Howe PC, all of Washington, D.C., William P. Redick Jr., of Whites Creek, Tenn., and Bradley MacLean and Stites & Harbison PLLC, both of Nashville, Tenn.

Review Denied

01-1053 Anderson v. Mathemay

Halieus corpus—Evidentiary hearing—Competency. Ruting below (7th Cir., 253 F.3d 1625 (2001)):

Evidentiary hearing is required to determine whether habeas corpus petitioner received ineffective assistance of counse) when his defense feam failed to pursue his request for hearing on his competency to stand trial; pentioner did not receive full and fair hearing on this issue in state courts.

01-1060 Bishop v. United States

Junes—Seating of statutorily disqualified jurar—Evidence
—Hearsay

Ruling below (8th Cir., 264 F 3d 535 (2001))-

"Out of court statements of tax detendant's deceased former bookkeeper that it was her fault that income was omixed from defendant's books was proffered by defendant to show truth of matter asserted and, therefore, was inadmissible hearsay; although juror was statutorily disqualified from sitting due to pending criminal charge, her presence on defendant's jury was not reversible error in absence of demonstration that she was biased.

01-1192 Wilson v. Georgia

Swarch and seizure -Vehicle stops—Reliability of informer.

Ruling below (Ga. Ct. App., 549 S.E.2d 418, 249 Ga.App. 560 (2001)):

Trial court's determination that informer whose tip led to stop of defendant's vehicle was reliable, based on police officer's testimony that informer had on two previous occasions provided officer with information that led to arrests and serzores of drugs, was not clearly erroneous, even though officer testified that, in absence of long-standing relationship with informer, he felt compelled to independently verify information in tip.

01-1194 Smaldona v. Seakowski

Habeas corpus—Limitations period Fquitable tolling— Issue preclusion.

Ruling below (2d Cir., 273 F.3d 133 (2001)):

Erroneous belief on part of attorney for habeas corpus petitioner that property filed state motion for collateral reflef "resets" lichtations period rather than simply telling it is not rare and exceptional circumstance meriting application of equitable tolling, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider issue of retroactive application of Zoneto v. Articz, 254 F.3d 374, 69 CrL 471 (2d Cir. 2001), which held that district court may—and in some cases must—stay proceedings on habeas petition that, as originally submitted, con-



Journal of Proceedings

2025

Regionted below are excerpts from the Supreme Court's Jourral of Proceedings covering all criminal matters acted upon by the court on the dates instructed

April 22, 2002

Certificari - Summary Disposition

DD-1936 Newkirk V. United States. The pention for a writ of perturate is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of Ashcroft V. Free Speech Condition, 535 U.S. ___ [7: Crt. 81] (2002)

60-8114 Mento v. United States. The motion of pethioner for leave to proceed in forma paupers and the petition for a wnit of certeorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. [71 Crl. 81] (2002).

01-674 Tampico v. United States. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of Asheroft v. Free Speech Conlinon, 535 U.S. __ [71 Crl. B1] (2002).

61-805 Fox v. United States. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of Aphenoft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. ____[71] CrL 81] (2002).

01-836 O'Connor v. United States. The petition for a writ of certiorart is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces for further consideration in light of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 536 U.S. ___ [7] Crl. 81] (2002).

01-1058 Peebles v. United States. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of Askeroft v. Free Speech Cocütion, 535 U.S. ___ [71 CrL 81] (2002).

01-7495 Snow v. United States. The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pouperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are grained. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fi9th Circuit for further consideration in light of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Couldton, 535 U.S. ___ [71 Crl. 81] (2002).

Orders in Pending Cases

01M48 Métoey v. Battles, Warden t. 01M60 Buell v. Mijchell, Warden

The motions to direct the Clerk to file peritions for writs of certionari out-of-time are denied.

01-9270 Paris v. United States. The motion of patitioner for leave to proceed in forma purperis is denied. Petitioner is allowed until May 13, 2002, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court,

Cortionari Granted

00-9094 Abdur'Rahman v. Bell, Warden. The motion of pertitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is greated.

The potition for a writ of certionari is granted limited to **
Questions I and 2 presented by the perition.

Cartlerari Denied

01-1060 Sishop v. United States

01-1192 Wilson v. Georgia

01-1194 Smaldinne v. Senkowski, Supt., Clinton

01-1202 Jackson v. Michigan

01-1282 Williams v. Jaglowski, Detective

01-1286 Harris v. Michigan

01-1309 Fortigily, Murphy

04-1400 Trammell v. United States

01-1405 Jones v. United States

01-1409 Avaios-Barriga v. United States

01-1414 Jimenez v. United States

01-1422 Williams v. United States

01-7693 Lewis v. California

01-7776 Wrinkles v. Indanta

01-7858 Hatten v. Texas

01-8405 Straughn v. Kimmy

01-8408 Rordner v. Missouri

01-8412 Armstrong v. Lebowitz

01-8421 Lewis v. Smith

01-8426 Mackintrush v. Arkansas

01-8427 Lippett v. Trippett, Warden

01-8428 Lambesta v. Greiner, Supr., Green Haven

01-8430 Tinsley v. Million, Warden

01-8439 McGee v. Hildehrand

01-9448 Shabazz v. California

01-8450 Stevens v. Colorado

01-8488 McCord v. Florida

01-8459 Douby V. Texas

01-6460 Cowan v. Phillips, Warden

01.8481 Parks v. Indiana

01-8486 Swails, v. GA Bd. of Pardons & Parole

02-8488 Williams v. Merkle, Warden

01-8471 Romano v. New York

01-8473 Partilla v. New York

01-8474 Brown v. Kennedy

01-8476 Caldwell v. Cahill-Masching, Warden

01-8483 Gallamore v. Cockrell, Dkr., TX DCJ

01-8485 Peoples v. Doolan

01.8486 Bagley v. Vance

01-8487 McFarland v. Garcia, Warden

01-8489 Hill v. Oklahuma

01.8493 Hadley v. Taylor

01-8494 Hilton v. Moore, Sec., FL DOC

01-8497 [[irsch v. lones, Warden

01-8498 Holcomb v. Kemna, Supt., Crossroads

01.8499 Gordon v. New Orleans

01.8500 Hernandez v. Candelaria, Warden

01-8501 Gross v. Kupec, Warden

01-9502 Khaalid v. Luebbers, Supl., Potosi

01-8504 Hill v. Florida

61.8820 Sontchi v. Cockrell, Dir., TX DCJ

01-8522 Naddi v Lamarque, Werden

01-8523 In ce Pellegnao

03.6524 Piłarczyk v. Ayers, Warden

01.8830 Spurgeon v Texas

01-8533 Woods v. Alabama

01-8535 Tracy v. Addison, Warden

01.8543 Dumas v. Jury Selection Commin.

01-8545 Anderson v. Lambert, Supt. WA.

01-**6560** Nobles v. Florida

01-8571 Dames v. Arkansas

02-8575 Jones v. Bryant, Warden

01-8684 Smith v. Luebbers, Supt., Pocosi

01-8586 Moore v. Jackson

01-8589 Moore v. Sternes, Warden

01-8609 Price v. Sutton, Admn'r



